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We model the mobility of mobile phone users to study the fundamental spreading patterns 
characterizing a mobile virus outbreak. We find that while Bluetooth viruses can reach all 
susceptible handsets with time, they spread slowly due to human mobility, offering ample 
opportunities to deploy antiviral software. In contrast, viruses utilizing multimedia messaging 
services could infect all users in hours, but currently a phase transition on the underlying call 
graph limits them to only a small fraction of the susceptible users. These results explain the lack of 
a major mobile virus breakout so far and predict that once a mobile operating system’s market 
share reaches the phase transition point, viruses will pose a serious threat to mobile 
communications.  
 
Lacking a standardized operating system, traditional cellphones have been relatively immune to 
viruses. Smartphones, however, can share programs and data with each other, representing a fertile 
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ground for virus writers (1-4). Indeed, since 2004 more than 420 smartphone viruses have been 
identified (2, 3), the newer ones having reached a state of sophistication that took computer viruses 
about two decades to arrive at (2). While smartphones currently represent less than 5% of the mobile 
market, given their reported high annual growth rate (4) they are poised to become the dominant 
communication device in the near future, raising the possibility of virus breakouts that could 
overshadow the disruption caused by traditional computer viruses (5).   
The spread of mobile viruses is aided by two dominant communication protocols. First, a 
Bluetooth virus can infect all Bluetooth-activated phones within a distance from 10 to 30m, resulting in 
a spatially localized spreading pattern similar to the one observed in the case of influenza (3, 6, 7), 
SARS (8, 9) and other contact-based diseases (10) (Fig. 1A). Second, an MMS virus can send a copy of 
itself to all mobile phones whose numbers are found in the infected phone’s address book, a long range 
spreading pattern previously exploited only by computer viruses (11, 12). Thus to quantitatively study 
the spreading dynamics of mobile viruses we need to simultaneously model the location (13), the 
mobility (14-17) and the communication patterns (18-21) of mobile phone users. To achieve this we use 
as input anonymized billing record of a mobile phone provider, providing the calling patterns and the 
coordinates of the closest mobile phone tower each time mobile subscribers use their phone (but not the 
coordinate of individual users). 
 The methods we used to track the spreading of a potential Bluetooth and MMS virus are 
described in the Supporting Online Material (SOM). Briefly, once a phone becomes infected with an 
MMS virus, after a τ=2min time it sends a copy of itself to each mobile phone number found in the 
handset’s phone book, approximated with the list of numbers the handset’s user communicated with 
during a month long observational period. A Bluetooth virus can infect only mobile phones within a 
distance r=10m. To track this process, we assign to each user an hourly location that is consistent with 
its travel patterns (13) and follow the infection dynamics within each mobile tower area using the SI 
model (22). That is, we consider that an infected user (I) infects a susceptible user (S), so that the 
number of infected users evolves in time as dI/dt=βSI/N, where the effective infection rate is β=µ<k> 
with µ=1 and the average number of contacts is <k>=ρA=NA/Atower, where A=πr2 represents the 
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Bluetooth communication area and ρ=N/Atower is the population density inside a tower’s service area. 
Once an infected user moves in the vicinity of a new tower, it will serve as a source of a Bluetooth 
infection in its new location.  
A cell phone virus can infect only the phones with the operating system (OS) it was designed for 
(2, 3), making the market share m of an OS an important free parameter in our study. Note that the 
current market share of various smartphone OSs vary widely, from as little as 2.6% for Palm OS, to 
64.3% of Symbian. Given that smartphones together represent less than 5% of all phones, the overall 
market share of these operating systems among all mobile phones is in the range of m 0.0013 for Palm 
OS and m  0.032 for Symbian, numbers that are expected to dramatically increase as smartphones 
replace traditional phones. To maintain the generality of our results, we treat m as a free parameter, 
finding that the spreading of both Bluetooth and MMS viruses is highly sensitive to the market share of 
the susceptible handsets (Fig. 2, A and B). Our simulations indicate that given sufficient time, a 
Bluetooth virus can reach all susceptible handsets, as user mobility guarantees that sooner or later each 
susceptible handset will find itself in the vicinity of an infected handset. The spreading rate strongly 
depends, however, on the handset’s market share. For example if the handset’s market share is m=0.01, 
it takes several months for a Bluetooth virus to reach all susceptible handsets. In contrast, for m=0.30 
the Bluetooth virus could infect 85% of susceptible handsets in a few hours and 99.8% in less than a 
week (Fig. 2A).  
The most striking difference between Bluetooth and MMS viruses comes in the timescales their 
spread requires. Indeed, given that it takes approximately two minutes for a typical MMS virus to copy 
itself on a new handset (23), an MMS epidemic reaches saturation in a few hours in contrast with a few 
days it requires the Bluetooth virus to infect all susceptible handsets (Fig. 2B). Thus while there is 
plenty of time to deploy an antiviral software for a Bluetooth virus before it could reach a large fraction 
of users, it is largely impossible to achieve the same for MMS viruses, given their explosive spread. The 
good news is that an MMS virus can reach only a small m-dependent fraction of users with a susceptible 
handset, as indicated by the saturation of the infection curves in Fig. 2B. The origin of this saturation is 
the fragmentation of the underlying call network. Indeed, in Fig. 1B we show a subset of the real call 
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network and assume for illustration that the handsets can have only two OSs (OS1 and OS2) with market 
shares m1=0.75 and m2=0.25. While the underlying call network itself is fully connected, the call graph 
of the users that share the same handset is fragmented into many islands (Fig. 1C). For m1=0.75 we 
observe a giant component (the largest connected cluster, Fig. 1C) of size Gm=0.80, meaning that it 
contains 80% of the users with the OS1 handset, the rest of the OS1 users being scattered in small 
isolated clusters. In contrast, for the OS2 handsets the giant component is tiny (Gm=0.06). If an MMS 
virus is released from a single handset, it can only reach the handsets in the cluster where the original 
handset is located, telling us that an MMS virus can infect at most a Gm fraction of all susceptible 
handsets, which is 80% for OS1 and 6% for OS2 in the example of Fig. 1. 
We find that the handset based fragmentation of the call graph (Fig. 1, B and C) is governed by a 
percolation phase transition at the market share mc=0.095 (Fig. 2C) (24). That is, for m<mc the user base 
is fragmented into many small isolated islands, making a major MMS virus viral outbreak impossible. In 
contrast, for handsets with m>mc there is a giant component, allowing the MMS virus to reach all 
handsets that are part of it. The value of mc and Gm for m>mc can be calculated using the generating 
function formalism (25), requiring as input only the network’s degree distribution P(k). Using P(k) 
charactering our user base, we find a reasonable agreement between the analytical predictions and the 
direct measurements of the saturation value of the MMS virus spreading in the mobile phone dataset 
(Fig. 2C), the small systematic deviation being rooted in the fact that the generating function formalism 
ignores the correlations in the call graph’s structure. The significance of Fig. 2C comes in its ability to 
explain why we have not observed a significant MMS outbreak so far: currently the market share of the 
largest OS is less than m 0.03, well under the predicted percolation transition point mc 0.095 (26, 27). 
For a more detailed discussion on the factors affecting m and mc see the SOM.   
The differences between MMS and Bluetooth viruses have a strong impact on their spreading 
dynamics as well. To see this we denote with T(q,m) the latency time, representing the average time 
necessary for a virus affecting a handset with market share m to reach a q fraction of all susceptible 
handsets. For a Bluetooth virus T(q,m) is finite for any q and m combination, given that with time the 
virus can reach all susceptible users (Fig. 2A). We find, however, that the latency time is highly 
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sensitive to m, a dependency well approximated by T(q,m)~m-0.6 (Fig. 2D, R-square>0.99, see SOM for 
statistical analysis), implying that the smaller a handset’s market share, the longer it will take for a virus 
to reach a q fraction of susceptible users. The observed divergence at m=0 indicates that for handsets 
with small market share the spreading process is exceptionally slow, as it takes a very long time for an 
infected user to come in contact with another user with a similar handset.  
Once again, the behavior of MMS viruses is qualitatively different: we find that T(q,m) diverges 
not at m=0 but at a finite mq* value (Fig. 2E), meaning that for handsets with market share m<mq* the 
virus is unable to reach a q fraction of users. Indeed, an MMS virus can reach at most a Gm fraction of 
eligible handsets (Fig. 2C), implying that Gm acts as a critical point for the dynamical spreading process 
and T(q>Gm, m)=∞. To characterize the observed singularity, we note that the maximum amount of 
time it takes an MMS virus to invade the giant component should be determined by the length of the 
longest minimal path Lmax characterizing the susceptible giant cluster (28, 29). As Fig. 2F shows, we 
find that both Lmax and the average minimal path length Lave diverge as (m-m*)-α with α  0.2 (R-
square>0.97, see SOM), a singularity that potentially drives the observed divergence of T(q,m) in the 
vicinity of mq* given by the equation q=G mq*. A more detailed measurement indicates, however, a 
systematic q-dependence of α(q) in T(q,m)~(m-mq*)-α(q) in the vicinity of the critical point (see Fig. 2E 
and the statistical analysis in SOM), hinting that there are factors beyond Lmax that contribute to the 
divergence of T(q,m). 
  In Figure 3 we follow the spread of an MMS and Bluetooth infection starting from the same user, 
illustrating that Bluetooth and MMS viruses differ in their spatial spreading patterns as well: a Bluetooth 
virus follows a wave like pattern, infecting predominantly users in the vicinity of the virus’s release 
point, while an MMS virus follows a more delocalized pattern, given that the users’ address book often 
contains phone numbers of far away individuals. To quantify the observed differences we measured the 
average distance between the cell phone tower where the first infected user is located and the location of 
towers servicing the newly infected users. A null model in which the virus always diffuses to the non-
infected towers bordering the already infected towers, thus following a classical two-dimensional 
diffusion process, is used as a reference. As Fig. 3B indicates, the typical source-infection distances 
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observed in the local model are significantly smaller than the distances recorded for either Bluetooth or 
MMS viruses, indicating the impact of a few long-distance travellers that incubate outbreaks in distant 
cells (13) in the Bluetooth spreading process. The average distance is the highest for MMS viruses, 
underlying the delocalized pattern charactering its spread. Fig. 3B also shows that the dependence of 
<D> on N is mainly a function of the spreading technology and appears to be independent m. 
Bluetooth and MMS viruses have their relative limitations: while the spread of a Bluetooth virus 
is rather slow due to human mobility, an MMS virus can reach only a small fraction of users due to the 
fragmentation of the call graph. Both limitations are avoided by hybrid viruses that can simultaneously 
use both Bluetooth and MMS connections to spread, the first of many such viruses being the 
“CommWarrior” released in 2005 (2, 3). We find, however, that the spreading dynamics of a hybrid 
virus also displays a complex market share dependence (Fig. 4, A and B), resulting from a nontrivial 
superposition of the Bluetooth and the MMS spreading modes. For example for m=0.15, when there is a 
giant component aiding the MMS spreading mode (Fig. 2C), the early stage of the spreading process is 
dominated by the rapid invasion of the MMS cluster. Subsequently, the Bluetooth mechanism allows the 
virus to invade the rest of the independent MMS clusters as well. For m=0.01, however, there is no 
MMS giant component, thus the spreading is dominated entirely by the Bluetooth capability, resulting in 
a significantly slower spreading pattern (note the different horizontal axes in Fig. 4, A and B).  
The relative role of the Bluetooth and the MMS spreading patterns for hybrid viruses is illustrated 
in Fig. 4, C and D, which show the latency time T(q,m) for q=0.15 and q=0.65. We find that for high m 
the MMS mechanism dominates the hybrid virus’s spreading pattern. As m decreases below mq* given 
by q=G mq* (Fig. 2E) the giant component becomes smaller than q, so T(q,m) for MMS diverges (green 
curve) and the Bluetooth mechanism starts dominating the spreading rate of hybrid virus. Therefore for 
small m the latency time of the hybrid virus converges to the latency time of a Bluetooth virus. We find, 
however, that the phase transition governing the fragmentation of the call graph plays a key role in the 
spread of hybrid viruses as well, delimiting the rapid MMS dominated and the slow human mobility 
driven spreading modes. 
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In Fig. 4, E and F we explore the additional infective power of a hybrid virus, defined as the ratio 
TMMS(q,m)/TH(q,m) (or TBT(q,m)/TH(q,m)) relative to its pure MMS (or BT) counterpart. We find that 
hybrid viruses are about three times faster than an MMS virus at constant market share for m>mc. The 
contribution of Bluetooth technology for a hybrid virus dominates for m≤mc, as MMS viruses are unable 
to spread in this region (TMMS(q,m)=∞). The additional infective power of a hybrid virus compared to a 
Bluetooth virus achieves its highest value close to mq*, decreasing quickly for m→0 and mildly for 
m→1, once again underlying the importance of the critical behaviour near mq*. 
Taken together, our results offer a comprehensive picture of the potential dangers posed by 
mobile viruses. We find that while a Bluetooth virus can reach the full susceptible user base, its spread 
is slowed by human mobility, offering ample time for developing and deploying countermeasures. In 
contrast, MMS viruses can reach most susceptible users within hours. Their spread is limited, however, 
by the market share driven phase transition that fragments the underlying call graph, allowing us to 
predict that no major virus breakout is expected for OS with market share under the critical point 
associated with the user base. Therefore, the current lack of major mobile virus outbreak can not be 
attributed to the absence of effective mobile viruses, but it is mainly rooted in the fragmentation of the 
call graph. Given, however, the rapid growth in the number of smartphones and the increasing market 
share of a few OS, it is not unconcievable that the phase transition point will be reached in the near 
future, raising the possibility of major viral outbreaks. While the most significant danger is posed by 
hybrid viruses that take advantage of both Bluetooth and MMS protocols, we find that their spread is 
also limited by the phase transition: hybrid viruses designed for OS with small market share are forced 
into the slow Bluetooth spreading mode, offering time to develop proper countermeasures. We believe 
that the understanding of the basic spreading patterns presented here could help estimate the realistic 
risks carried by mobile viruses and aid the development of proper measures to avoid the costly impact of 
future outbreaks. 
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FIG. 1. The spreading mechanisms of mobile viruses. (A) A Bluetooth virus can infect all 
phones found within Bluetooth range from the infected phone, its spread being determined by 
the owner’s mobility patterns. An MMS virus can infect all susceptible phones whose number 
is found in the infected phone’s phonebook, resulting in a long-range spreading pattern that is 
independent of the infected phone’s physical location. (B) A small neighbourhood of the call 
graph constructed starting from a randomly chosen user and including all mobile phone 
contacts up to fourth degrees from it. The color of the node represents the handset’s OS, in 
this example randomly assigned such that 75% of the nodes represent OS1, and the red are 
the remaining handsets with OS2 (25%). (C) The clusters in the call graph on which an MMS 
virus affecting a given OS can spread, illustrating that an MMS virus can reach at most the 
number of users that are part of the giant component of the appropriate handset. As the 
example for the OS shows, the size of the giant component highly depends on the handset’s 
market share (see also Fig. 2C).  
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FIG. 2. The spreading patterns of Bluetooth and MMS viruses. (A) The changes in the ratio of 
infected and susceptible handsets (I/N) with time in the case of a BT virus affecting for 
handsets with different market share m. (B) Same as in panel (A), but for MMS viruses, the 
saturation in I/N indicating that an MMS virus can reach only a finite fraction of all susceptible 
phones. (C) The size of the giant component Gm in function of the market share m. The blue 
symbols correspond to the saturation values measured in Fig. 2B, while the red line is the 
theoretical prediction based on percolation theory (the deviations are attributed mainly to finite 
size effects and degree correlations, as the calculation assumed an infinite call graph). (D) The 
latency time needed to infect q=0.65 or q=0.15 fraction of susceptible handsets via a Bluetooth 
virus, approximated with T(q=0.65, m)~ -0.63 0.05 ±m and T(q=0.15, m)~ -0.60 0.04 ±m (continuous lines). 
(E) The latency time for an MMS virus for q=0.05, 0.15 and 0.30. The continuous lines 
correspond to T(q,m)~(m-mq*)-α(q), where the best fits indicate a systematic q-dependence, i.e.  
α(0.05)=0.20 ± 0.02, α(0.15)=0.17 ± 0.01, α(0.30)=0.14 ± 0.01. (F) Log-log plot showing the 
average minimal path length Lave and the longest minimal path length Lmax for the largest 
cluster. The fits correspond to Lmax~ -0.20 0.02( *)m - m ±  and Lave~ -0.19 0.02( *)m - m ± . The curves on (A), 
(B), (D) are obtained from 10 independent simulations and (E), (F) represent average over 100 
runs. For more statistical analysis of the fits in (D), (E), (F), please see the detailed discussion 
in SOM. 
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FIG. 3. Spatial patterns in the spread of Bluetooth and MMS viruses. (A) The virus starts from 
the same user located at the tower marked by the red arrows. The three panels show the 
percentage of infected users in the vicinity of each mobile phone tower (denoted by the 
voronoi cell that approximates each tower’s service area). On the right panel we show the 
corresponding time dependent infection curves, marking the moments when the spatial 
distribution was recorded. (B) Average distance between the tower where the infection was 
originally started and the most currently infected as a function of N (Three red and blue curves 
correspond to m=0.1, m=0.5 and m=1), denoting the number of towers with at least one 
infected users, used as a proxy of time. The green line is obtained from a null model which 
assumes that the virus can only spread from one tower’s service area to its neighbour towers’ 
service areas. The curves on (B) are obtained from 100 independent simulations.  
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FIG. 4. The spreading patterns of hybrid viruses. (A and B) The time dependent fraction of 
infected users for a hybrid virus spreading on a handset with (A) m=0.01 and (B) m=0.15 
market share handset, compared with the Bluetooth and MMS spreading modes. (C and D) 
The m-dependence of latency time for hybrid, MMS and Bluetooth viruses for (C) q=0.15 and 
(D) q=0.65. (E and F) Ratio between the time it takes a Bluetooth or MMS virus to reach (E) 
15% and (F) 0.65% of the population divided by the time it takes a hybrid virus to reach the 
same fraction of the population as a function of the market share m. The curves on (A), (B), 
(C), (D) are obtained from 10 independent simulations. 
